Wednesday
15 Nov 2006
Battling Spam and the Ring of Gyges
Humanized is currently fighting a battle against spam on the comments section of this weblog. Automated spambots have been posting hundreds of “comments” a day, which are content-free posts under fake names containing links to dubious merchandise. They are often obscene and sometimes more offensive than dead-baby jokes.
There are four strategies we could use to keep spam comments off of our page.
Method 1: Automatic filtering. Using various mechanical means (keyword filtering, IP tracking, etc.), we automatically classify each new comment as “spam” or “not spam”. This method has the advantage of introducing no interface overhead to the user. Unfortunately, it’s difficult to achieve. Like biological organisms, comment-spam messages have evolved camouflage in order to hide from their natural predator, the spam filter. Most comment-spam messages are mundane sentences like “Hey great blog, take a look at this link I found”, which is identical to a legitimate comment. Only the commenter’s name and the destination of the link give clues to its spammitude. This makes it very hard to design an automatic filter which will not be plagued with false positives and false negatives.
Automatic filtering is the first method we attempted to use for our site. However, as traffic increased our filters were soon overwhelmed. We were spending hours a day manually deleting all the filth that got through the filters. We decided to look for a better option.
Method 2: “Captcha”. This oddly-spelled word refers to those systems requiring a user to read characters or a word from a distorted or fuzzy image, and re-enter them. Like automatic filtering, this is another attempt to reduce computer-generated spam. The theory is that we can prevent automated posting of comments by requiring users to perform a meaningless task which is easy for a human being, but impossible for a computer program. This theory assumes that posting spam manually, one-by-one, is not worth a spammer’s time, so he will give up, while legitimate commenters will be willing and able to decipher the captcha.
However, this might not be a good assumption. A bedrock principle of humane interface design is that computers should not force users to perform arbitrary and irrelevant tasks; if a user’s goal is to enter a comment, it’s hard to think of anything more arbitrary and less relevant than “Please decipher these squiggly numbers to prove you are not a computer.” Some people will get annoyed enough by this requirement that they will give up on commenting. Other people — the visually impaired, for instance, who use screen readers — will find the requirement impossible. Since humane interfaces are our first priority, we decided that the captcha is unacceptable for our site.
Method 3: Moderator approval. After a user submits a comment, but before it appears on the site, one of our employees must read it and decide whether or not it’s spam. Only approved comments get posted. This makes extra work for us, and it introduces a delay before the comment appears, but it is the only method which keeps out all spam, doesn’t block out legitimate messages, and does not force the user to jump through any interface hoops.
Method 4: The accountability system. Make our best attempt to hold commenters to fixed identities so that we could hold each one accountable, and kick off spammers. From an interface standpoint, this would require making the user jump through hoops (i.e. a login screen) before posting. But it gets worse: To discourage spammers from simply using disposable accounts, we would have to use a multi-step account-creation process, perhaps involving email-address verification, in the hopes that a real user would have the patience to go through the process but a spammer would not.
This was unacceptable to us; we want to encourage comments by making them as easy as possible. If users have to go through a multi-step account-creation process with email-address verification before they can post their first comment, they are likely to decide that it’s not worth the trouble! We expect that our average user already has account names and passwords for dozens of other websites and services, and isn’t particularly interested in creating yet another set just to be able to comment on this one blog.
Mutual Accountability and Reputation
The accountability system is especially interesting because it is a fundamentally different strategy from the others. Can you see why? The other three methods have one thing in common: they assume that users are untrustworthy. A central authority — either a human moderator, or some sort of algorithm — is used to forcibly restrict what users can and can’t do.
But accountability systems are different. They assume that most users are trustworthy and should be free to do whatever they want. When a user abuses the system, by posting spam for instance, other users can choose not to interact with the abuser (by blacklisting or “killfile”-ing him.)
My favorite example of an effective accountability system is eBay’s feedback system. If someone rips other people off, he will accrue negative feedback and no-one will want to do business with him. eBay doesn’t kick people off, or punish them in any way, for having negative feedback: they don’t need to. The visibility of negative feedback to other users is enough. It’s kind of a “scarlet letter”. Allow users to identify the “bad guys”, and the users will regulate themselves. People on eBay take negative feedback very seriously.
Whether it’s called “feedback”, “reputation”, or “karma”, accountability systems work only when a user has a fixed identity for his actions to attatch to. If you can throw away an identity and start over every time you get bad karma, then the accountability system is significantly weakened.
I call this the “ring-of-Gyges effect”. Gyges was a character in a parable by Plato who found a magic ring that let him turn invisible. Since he could avoid all consequences of his actions, there was no reason for him to behave morally. Starting a new account is the Internet equivalent of turning yourself invisible to escape punishment.
This is why accounts with no positive feedback are regarded with great suspicion on eBay: because they might be a new name for an old user with bad feedback. This creates a bit of a problem for legitimate new users trying to get started on eBay; they may have to make several purchases first before anyone will trust them enough to buy from them.
Contrast eBay with a protocol designed in an earlier, more innocent era, and which therefore has no built-in accountability system: email! Email spam is a direct result of the ring-of-Gyges effect. If email accounts could be held accountable (no pun intended), it would be very easy to simply blacklist spammers. Users could choose not to interact with email addresses which have proven themselves to be badly-behaved, just as users choose not to interact with negatively-feedbacked eBay accounts.
But alas, email addresses are easily disposable, blacklists are useless, and spam is everywhere. Email’s failure is its lack of accountability. Even if we fix the holes in SMTP, we still have to deal with the ring-of-Gyges effect.
There’s a great example of how an accountability system can evolve over time. Wikipedia was originally based on the idea that anyone could edit anonymously. This worked well for a while, but because of recent increases in vandalism, Wikipedia has had to modify its policy slightly: now only registered users can create pages, and some controversial or recently edited pages get locked with this message:
Because of recent vandalism or other disruption, editing of this article by unregistered or newly registered users is currently disabled. Such users may discuss changes, request unprotection, or create an account.
Note the phrase unregistered or newly registered users. This sounds like a response to a ring-of-Gyges problem: newly registered users might be old vandals with new names. You must establish yourself as a trustworthy member of the community before you can edit the locked pages.
Accountability and Interface Design
Holding users accountable always requires authenticating their identity, which nearly always requires them to go through extra steps before they can begin using a system. Thus, authentication incurs an interface cost. Plus there is an additional interface cost to create an account in the first place, as I mentioned earlier. Not only do users have to learn and navigate the account-creation interface, they must also come up with a new username and password (or recycle an old one, which we all know we’re not supposed to do, but we all do anyway…) This cost is generally enough to push some users away from participating in a site. When the whole purpose of the site was to encourage user interaction, this makes the developers very sad.
(You might be able to think of some exceptions to the authentication-requires-extra-steps rule. For instance, remote login using ssh with a public/private keypair and a stored passphrase. A user set up with a system like that doesn’t have to enter anything to login; however, the process to initially set it up is extremely archaic and inhumane, and not at all appropriate for simple things like commenting on websites!)
If only there were a concept of a universal online identity, accepted everywhere, and defended rigorously! Then users could authenticate once per browser session, and be recognized at every site they visit. For users, the annoyance of creating passwords and logging in to every site would disappear. For webmasters, the annoyance of implementing a custom user database would disappear. Interfaces would be simplified. The reputation of a user, attached to this identity, could extend across all sites. Abusive users could be identified, blacklists could be shared, and users could choose whether or not to communicate with blacklisted entities.
(Maybe there is an alternate universe where AOL invested in broadband technology early and then took over the Internet. In that universe, a user’s AOL screen-name is a universal identity recognized everywhere, and AOL can be stingy about giving out new names, to prevent the ring-of-Gyges effect. But this alternate-universe Internet would also have drawbacks compared to ours: lack of privacy, and the potential for abuse of power by the all-powerful gatekeeper AOL. Would it be worth it? An interesting scenario for you to ponder.)
There have been attempts at creating such a system. TypeKey is one example. Bloggers can use TypeKey authentication instead of implementing their own. Not only do they save development time, but users with TypeKey identities don’t need to keep creating new passwords for each blog they want to comment on. This is a good idea which faces a classic chicken-and-the-egg problem in getting people to adopt it. But if TypeKey or some equivalent does become widely adopted, it might help sites like ours to provide accountability with a minimum of interface cost to our users.
What Next?
The evolution of accountability systems seems to me to be key to the further development of social networking. There are several trade-offs involved. Internet users love anonymity. But they hate spam, trolls, wiki-vandalism, and people ripping them off on eBay. They also tend to dislike having a central authority arbitrarily tell them what they can and can’t do. I’m generalizing a lot here, but I think most Internet users prefer democratic, decentralized solutions wherever possible.
When users can work together, freely sharing knowledge, without centralized authoritarian control, they can create great things, like Wikipedia, using their collective intelligence. But when users aren’t or can’t be held individually accountable for their actions, bad behavior goes unpunished, and a thriving community may degenerate into the Internet equivalent of an angry mob. A central authority can prevent the angry mob effect, but it can also stifle the creativity of the collective intelligence. Mutual accountability can eliminate the need for a dictator, but sacrifices anonymity.
The ideas of accountability and identity, and the technological strategies to support them, are changing rapidly, as are the trade-offs involved. This article will be obsolete by the time you read it. As you travel around the Internet, look at the different strategies that your favorite social sites use to prevent abuses. Do they use a moderator/central authority? Do they use an automated system like captchas or filtering in an attempt to mechanically prevent abuses? Or do they require you to create an identity which can accumulate positive and negative reputation? How well does it work, and what does it do about the ring-of-Gyges effect? And what sort of user-interfaces do your favorite sites use to minimize the cost to you?
For now, Humanized has decided that an accountability system is not the way to go for our weblog; we are instead using manual moderation of all comments until such time as we can come up with something better. Manual moderation of comments means setting ourselves up as dictators of what can and can’t be said. This has its own problems, but at least it will allow us to eliminate spam without making our commenting interface more difficult for users.

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